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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan yrityskauppojen työllisyysvaikutuksia käyttäen yhdistettyä 
aineistoa vuosilta 1989-2003. Aineisto kattaa kaikki sektorit. Vertaamme kansainvälis-
ten yrityskauppojen vaikutuksia sekä kotimaisiin yrityskauppoihin että yritysten sisäi-
siin rakennejärjestelyihin. Tulosten valossa kansainväliset yrityskaupat vähentävät työl-
lisyyttä teollisuudessa. Kansainvälisten yrityskauppojen vaikutukset ovat muilla toimi-
aloilla huomattavasti heikompia. Kotimaiset yrityskaupat ja yritysten sisäiset rakenne-
järjestelyt johtavat myös tyypillisesti työllisyyden heikkemiseen, mutta vaikutukset 
vaihtelevat sektoreittain. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the employment effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by 
using matched establishment-level data from Finland over the period 1989-2003. The 
data covers all sectors. We compare the employment effects of cross-border M&As with 
the effects arising from two different types of domestic M&As and internal 
restructurings. The results reveal that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in 
manufacturing employment. The effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-
manufacturing are much weaker. Changes in ownership associated with domestic 
M&As and internal restructurings also typically cause employment losses, but they 
exhibit an interesting sectoral variation.  
JEL Codes: G34, J23, L23 
Key words: mergers and acquisitions, M&As, takeovers, employment, workforce 
 
 2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses the effect of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the employment 
of firms’ establishments in Finland. M&As are a key device to enlarge a purchasing 
firm in all developed countries. For instance, in Finland, hardly any significant 
restructuring of any industry has been carried out without ownership changes. In most 
countries M&As have developed in a procyclical manner. There is no upward trend in 
the frequency of domestic M&As. In contrast, the volume of cross-border M&As has 
started to increase at a rapid pace recently. Cross-border M&As represent an important 
part of the globalisation of business in many different industries. They have spread from 
the manufacturing to the service industries. Rossi and Volpin (2003) estimate that cross-
border M&As cover roughly a quarter of the total M&A activity nowadays. This 
evolution has inspired a lot of debate in European countries. In general, the attitude 
towards M&As has been rather positive, because they restructure the economy. Despite 
this, cross-border M&As, especially, have been seen, in public debate, as a threat to 
employment.  
Systematic micro-level evidence on the causal effect of different types of M&As on 
employment is still quite sparse despite the obvious importance of the topic. For 
instance, economic literature on multinational companies has mostly analysed the 
potential effects of foreign acquisitions on productivity and wages (e.g. Bellak, 2004). 
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the employment effects of M&As 
on target firms by using matched establishment-level data from Finland over the period 
1989-2003. In this paper, we do not focus solely on cross-border or domestic M&As, 
but we analyse the employment effects of several different types of M&As. We classify 
M&As as being either a cross-border M&A (in which the purchaser is a foreign 
company that is located abroad), a domestic M&A with a domestically-owned 
purchaser, a domestic M&A with a foreign-owned company that is located in Finland or 
an internal restructuring in which the purchaser is not another company. Most of the 
earlier research studies have used relatively small samples of companies, making it hard 
to generalize the results obtained. The use of comprehensive data on several different 
types of M&As puts us in a somewhat better position to analyse the issue at hand. 
The Finnish case is interesting from the perspective of cross-border M&As and the 
domestic M&As with foreign ownership. Since Finland is a small open country, the 
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enlargement of foreign ownership can have a more profound effect on employment in 
Finland than in large countries. These issues have been a subject of public debate in 
Finland recently owing to the fact that cross-border M&As have greatly increased in 
number during the late 1990s, following the lift of restrictions over foreign-ownership 
during the early 1990s.1 Since foreign firms have settled down by establishing a Finnish 
affiliate, they have typically continued to enlarge through domestic M&As, especially in 
many service industries, like transport and various other business activities.  
Our paper deviates from most of the earlier papers in this strand of research regarding 
the data coverage, the definition of M&As and the methods that are used to analyse the 
effect of M&As on employment. Most of the earlier papers have focused on 
manufacturing, mainly owing to the availability of data sources. This is important, 
because the share of manufacturing has declined in almost all developed countries over 
the past few decades. This applies to Finland. We use data that also includes services. In 
particular, the dynamics of employment may be different between these industries, 
because services are less capital-intensive than manufacturing. Hence, it is interesting to 
analyse the effect of M&As on employment separately in the manufacturing sector and 
in the service sector. It may well be that conclusions obtained in the earlier studies of 
this strand of research at least partly reflect partly their focus, which is primarily on the 
manufacturing sector.  
Regarding the definition of M&As, we use detailed information on the actual events of 
different types of M&As.2 For example, the interference of foreign firms and foreign 
ownership is then more accurately specified than in the studies which consider a 
registered change from domestic to foreign majority ownership. From the 
methodological perspective, most of the earlier papers on the topic (e.g. Conyon et al. 
2002b; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004) have relied solely on traditional parametric methods 
to identify the effect of M&As on employment. In contrast, we use non-parametric, 
matching methods to pursue the issue at hand. Our data enables us to ensure that the 
control group to whom the establishments – which have been targets of different types 
of M&As – are compared with include only such establishments that have not been 
                                                          
1 Lovio (2004) provides an overview of the globalisation of Finnish corporations. 
2 Our data does not permit us to separate friendly and hostile takeovers from each other, which has been 
possible in some other papers (e.g. Conyon et al. 2002b). 
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involved in any kind of M&As. This allows us to isolate the pure effects of several 
different types of M&As on employment.  
In this paper, we discover that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing 
employment. The effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-manufacturing 
are much weaker. Domestic M&As with a domestic purchaser, instead, have negative 
employment effects for all sectors. The impact of domestic M&As with foreign-owned 
purchasers is remarkably negative in construction and other services. In addition, 
internal restructurings have negative employment effects in trade (including hotels and 
restaurants). Taken together, our most important empirical finding is that almost all 
changes in ownership lead to employment losses. That cross-border M&As had a 
negative impact only in manufacturing and that domestic M&As with foreign-owned 
purchasers had, however, a substantial negative impact on employment in construction 
and other services may emerge from the situation in which foreign interference in 
service industries develops in two stages: first to establish a bridgehead through a cross-
border M&A and, after this, to strengthen the dominance of the market through 
domestic M&As. Apparently, the deep-going rationalisation of activities is typical only 
of the latter stage, because deeper knowledge of the market has developed for a foreign 
player. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a survey of the earlier empirical 
literature that has analysed the effects of M&As on employment. By a wide margin, 
most of the available empirical evidence originates from the USA or the UK. Other 
countries are not well covered. Section 3 discusses the most important theoretical 
arguments regarding the effect of M&As on employment. Section 4 contains a 
description of our matched establishment-level data that is used to address the issue at 
hand. Section 5 describes the empirical framework that is used to analyse the effect of 
M&As on employment. Section 6 reports our estimation results. The last section 
concludes. 
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2. RELEVANT EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Brown and Medoff (1988), Bhagat et al. (1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report 
negative effects of M&As on employment in the USA. In contrast, McGuckin et al. 
(1995) and McGuckin and Nguyen (2000) discover some positive effects of M&As on 
employment in the manufacturing sector, in particular, at the plant level in the USA. In 
addition, Ollinger et al. (2005) report that there have not been negative effects of M&As 
on employment in the food industry over the period 1977-1987. It is important to note 
that part of the evidence is based on very restricted samples of companies covering 
narrow segments of the US economy. For instance, Brown and Medoff (1988) obtain 
their estimates on the effect of M&As on employment from a sample of companies 
located in the state of Michigan for the period 1978-1984. This may be the reason for 
somewhat mixed results on the employment effects of M&As that have emerged from 
the USA.  
UK companies have been subjects of substantial takeover activity for long time. For that 
reason, they represent an interesting opportunity to investigate the effects of M&As on 
subsequent employment. Conyon et al. (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) report the negative 
effects of M&As on employment in the UK by using data on 277 listed companies over 
the period 1967-1996. Interestingly, the negative effects on employment are particularly 
pronounced for related and hostile transactions. Girma and Görg (2004) discover by 
using data from the UK electronics industry for the period 1980-1993 that the incidence 
of foreign takeover reduces the employment growth of a domestic establishment, in 
particular for unskilled labour. Hence, cross-border M&As have some effects on the 
determination of skill-mix in companies.  
In addition to evidence that stems from US and UK studies, there is some empirical 
evidence from other European countries. For instance, Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2002) 
discover by using Italian firm-level data over the 1990s that, compared with firms that 
were not subject to any ownership change, companies targeted by foreign investors 
marked an increase in both labour productivity and the employment level a few years 
after the acquisition. This result holds especially if the target firm is a small firm and if 
the investor is a European multinational company.  
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For Sweden, which is a small open economy much like Finland, Siegel and Simons 
(2006) report by using linked employer-employee data of manufacturing companies 
over the period 1985-1998 that M&As lead to improvements in firm performance and 
plant productivity, although they also result in the downsizing of establishments and 
firms in terms of employment. However, their linked employer-employee data do not 
include cross-border M&As separately. Hence, they are not able to compare the 
employment effects of different types of M&As (cross-border M&As vs. domestic 
M&As). In addition, they base their identification of M&As on changes in plant codes 
by Statistics Sweden, not on the records regarding the actual events of M&As.   
Comparison of US and European experiences regarding M&As provides an interesting 
perspective on the issue. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) study the effect of M&As on 
employment in Europe and the USA by using merger data for the USA that begin in the 
late 1970s, for other countries in the mid-80s. They use dynamic GMM models in order 
to produce results and they provide a brief comparison of the employment effects of 
cross-border and domestic M&As. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) do not find any adverse 
effects of M&As on labour demand in the USA that have been reported in some of the 
earlier studies. However, there is the prevalence of the negative effect on employment 
in Europe. The quantitative magnitude of the effect of M&As on employment is 
substantial in Europe, because Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) document that European 
mergers reduce the demand for labour by about 10% on average. Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2004) attribute this to more rigid labour markets in Europe than in the USA. For that 
reason companies are forced to use M&As in Europe as a restructuring device.   
There are some earlier empirical studies on the effects of foreign acquisitions, using 
Finnish data. All these papers have used linked employer-employee data covering solely 
the manufacturing sector. In addition, the available studies consider either productivity 
effects (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2004; Maliranta, 2005) or wage and education 
effects (Huttunen, 2006). In particular, Huttunen (2006) reports that the share of highly 
educated workers of the total workforce declines, although slightly and slowly, after the 
ownership has changed from domestic to foreign in the acquired plants.3  
 
                                                          
3 Foreign acquisition is defined in Huttunen’s (2006) paper based on the share of foreign-ownership as 
being over 20 per cent. We use data on the actual events of different types of M&As, instead. 
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3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To recognize the motives for M&As helps us to understand how M&As influence 
employment. The most important motives of M&As (e.g. Mueller, 2003) are to 
1) obtain genuine synergy gains (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990); 
2) utilize scales economies in various forms; 
3) strengthen the market power in pricing; 
4) revise the implicit agreements related to the firm’s personnel and other stake 
holders; and  
5) promote the managers’ own deviating interests. 
An M&A creates synergy gains when the more efficient modes of actions in either an 
acquiring or in an acquired firm are extended to comprise the whole enlarged firm. In 
horizontal M&As the marginal costs of production in an inefficient firm typically lower 
to the level which prevails in the more efficient party of an M&A. In vertical M&As the 
mechanism may be different. An M&A may then intensify incentives to exert effort in 
various activities, for example, in the commercialization of innovations, as suggested by 
the empirical findings of Lehto and Lehtoranta (2004) and Lehto (2006). It is clear that 
synergy-promoting M&As primarily increase productivity. These types of M&As may 
also support employment of the acquiring and the target company. The reason is that by 
raising efficiency, the parties of M&As become more competitive, which may help 
them to take over the market from their competitors.  
It is not, however, evident that M&As, in general, only tend to internalize the benefits of 
genuine synergy gains abstracted from the utilization of scale economics. It is plausible 
that the parties of M&As often aim to jointly use the assets (including human capital) 
which the new parent firm possesses after the merger.4 Sharing assets in this way is 
motivated by the cost savings obtained. The downsizing of overlapping activities in this 
process almost always involves reductions of the workforce. 
By definition, M&As decrease the number of independent players, which concentrates 
the market. Salant et al. (1983), and Perry and Porter (1985) have shown that it does not 
pay to purchase another firm in order to decrease competition and to gain pricing power 
                                                          
4 Markusen ( 2002) has put forward these ideas in the context of multinational firms. 
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in the standard Cournot competition. However, when deviating from the Cournot 
framework, the positive effect of decreasing the number of players on profits is, in any 
case, present in horizontal M&As. Therefore, the tendency to internalise the 
strengthened market power by higher prices will be part of horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions, and one can expect that, for this part, M&As will reduce the scale of 
production and labour input, too.  
Shleifer and Summers (1987) have strongly argued that the change in control associated 
with, especially, hostile M&As offers an opportunity for a new management team to 
renege on implicit and explicit labour contracts that typically constitute obstacles to 
layoffs. In particular, implicit labour contracts are often used in order to encourage firm-
specific investments (e.g. Malcomson, 1997). They are binding actions by the old 
owners of the company and the old management team. However, the new management 
team that is put in place after an M&A is able to renege on implicit labour contracts and 
to reduce the number of the workforce. It is important to note that in Finland collective 
labour agreements are also binding on all foreign owners. Hence, it is only possible to 
renege on implicit labour contracts.  
The idea that the managers of firms engage in “empire building” has long been regarded 
as one possible explanation for M&As (Schumpeter, 1934; Marris, 1963). The managers 
are also considered to deviate from the owner’s interests when they use “free cash” to 
undertake other firms, as hypothised by Jensen (1986). If these motives have any 
influence, they suggest a negative influence on the purchasing firm’s profits but, 
regarding the impact on the employment, the forecast is unclear. It is plausible that the 
manager’s behaviour is contingent on the requirements and values that vary in time. 
Nowadays, when the managers’ success is increasingly evaluated through various 
efficiency measures, the tendency to become bigger has lost a lot of its endearment.  
The effect of M&As on employment may be contingent on the type of M&As. The 
factors that matter are distance between the target and acquiring firm (domestic or 
foreign in our study);  
i) the nationality of the 
ii) the acquiring firm (domestic or foreign); and 
iii) the institutional nature of an acquirer (another firm or another form of M&A).   
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Despite the fact that there are convincing arguments for expecting a decline in the 
amount of the workforce after an M&A, it is important to recognize that the effect of 
M&As on employment is not always necessarily negative. For instance, according to the 
traditional theory of multinational companies that is known as the so-called OLI 
paradigm (e.g. Markusen, 2002), a multinational company brings with it certain 
intangible asset, which gives it a competitive edge over domestic firms.5 In this case a 
multinational company and a cross-border M&A as well as a domestic M&A with a 
foreign-owned firm may well increase its workforce in the target country, taken that it is 
able to increase its market share vis-à-vis its domestic competitors. This scenario may 
occur in the service industries, where widely known brands, for instance, are important 
for the success of the company.  
Asymmetry of information is able to explain why an M&A’s impact is contingent on its 
type. Previous research on the motives of M&As has discovered that information on the 
target firm may become more incomplete when the distance between the purchasing 
firm and the target firm increases (Lehto, 2006). The asymmetric information then 
explains why most purchasers are located fairly close to targets. If remote purchasers 
are excluded, this phenomenon may not be relevant as regards the effects of M&As. But 
if, after all, the nearby purchasers have, on average, more precise information about the 
target firms and their market than distant purchasers, this may be relevant for the effects 
of M&As, too. It is illustrative that in the largest and in the deepest going M&As in 
Finland the purchaser has always been domestic. This especially concerns large 
combination mergers in which several firms have merged into a single large firm so that 
each party of the merger is (in our data) considered as being a target firm in turn. It 
looks as if the better touch of the local markets has made it possible for profound 
rationalisation. From this, one may derive a hypothesis that radical structural reforms 
with considerable negative effects on employment are rather characterized by domestic 
M&As and, perhaps, internal restructurings than cross-border M&As.  
On the other hand, one can argue that for foreign owners it may be easier to loosen 
themselves from implicit contracts that preserve employment in order to maximize the 
short-run profits. For this, one may expect that cross-border M&As or domestic M&As 
– in which the purchasing firm is foreign-owned – may cause a greater negative impact 
                                                          
5 OLI is the abbreviation for ”ownership-location-internationalisation”. 
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on employment than other domestic M&As and internal restructurings. Casual Finnish 
evidence suggests that this is not a totally unlikely scenario, because foreign owners do 
not usually have respect for local interests regarding employment or labour standards 
that are often set well above the minimum standards that have been agreed upon in 
collective labour agreements. 
To sum up, the theoretical discussion does not give a clear prediction about the effects 
of different types of M&As on employment. Hence, the net effect of M&As on 
employment is an empirical matter. The negative effect seems, however, to be the most 
likely. Indeed, most authors in this strand of research take the position that M&As cause 
negative effects on employment over time (e.g. Conyon et al. 2002b). In addition, most 
of the earlier empirical investigations in this strand of research have reported 
statistically significant negative effects, especially for European countries (e.g. Gugler 
and Yurtoglu, 2004). 
We explore the effect of M&As on employment in three different industry blocks, 
which are  
a) manufacturing (including utility industries); 
b) construction and other services; and 
c) trade (including hotels and restaurants).  
Manufacturing is largely global by nature, from which it follows that foreign firms are 
equally present in the relevant market as domestic firms are. Owing to this, in 
manufacturing the opportunities to benefit from the restriction of competition can be 
considered as being scarce in all types of M&As. In the service industries a domestic 
purchaser, being located in the same relevant market as the target firm, may have a 
greater interest than a foreign purchaser to buy another firm in order to limit 
competition. This especially concerns trade. Because the service market is often 
geographically restricted and because the joint use of assets may encounter geographical 
limits, as suggested by the findings in Lehto (2006), we hypothise that in the service 
sectors rationalisation through asset sharing and the related downsizing of employment 
is more typical of domestic M&As (and internal restructuring) than of cross-border 
M&As. To conclude, we expect that in the service industries and in construction, 
domestic M&As (in which a purchaser can also be foreign-owned) and internal 
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restructurings have a larger negative impact on employment than cross-border M&As. 
Such a difference is not expected in manufacturing.  
 
4. THE DATA 
Our data on M&As originates from the magazine Talouselämä, which is published on a 
weekly basis. M&As are defined based on an ownership share of at least 50%. The 
magazine reports all M&As in which either the acquiring or the acquired firm is a 
Finnish one, or in which either the acquiring or the acquired firm is owned by a Finnish 
company. The magazine covers all sectors. The only major restriction is that the 
magazine Talouselämä does not keep a record of M&As in which either the acquirer’s 
or the target’s turnover is less than FIM 3 million (or around 510 000 Euros). In 
addition, we have omitted from the analysis those firms that have been targets of M&As 
two (or more) times within a single year in order to avoid conflating the effects of 
different types of M&As on employment. The number of those cases is very small, 
however. The whole analysis is done at the establishment level, because different 
establishments that belong to the same firm may perform differently. In addition, in 
some cases only a certain establishment, not the whole firm, is purchased. Hence, we 
have linked firms that have been subjects of M&As according to the magazine 
Talouselämä to their establishments.  
The data allows us to separate four different types of M&As. These are cross-border 
M&As, domestic M&As with domestically-owned purchasers, domestic M&As with 
foreign-owned purchasers and internal restructurings. Their exact definitions are given 
in Table 1. “Domestic” refers to a firm that is domestically located. A domestically 
located firm can then be either domestically-owned or foreign-owned. Hence, in this 
classification “foreign” has a dual meaning: firstly, it refers to the distance between the 
acquirer and the target firm and, secondly, it specifies the nationality of an acquirer’s 
owners from the target firm’s viewpoint. We classify internal restructuring into its own 
category, because we think that this type of M&A may differ from others, because 
restructuring without the presence of another firm lacks some potential for synergy 
gains but may favour closer knowledge of the target firm’s internal potential to renew.  
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Table 1. Description of the variables 
 
 Variables Definition/measurement  
  
Types of M&As:  
  
Cross-border M&A Cross-border M&As are defined as cases where the acquiring firm is 
foreign. “Foreign” here means that the firm, which is reported by the 
magazine Talouselämä to be the acquirer, is not located in Finland at the 
time of the M&A. (Source: the magazine Talouselämä)  
Domestic M&A (Domestic owner, located 
in Finland) 
We separate two types of domestic M&As based on ownership. (These 
types are added together in Figs. 1-2). First, there are domestic M&As, 
where the acquirer is domestically-owned and located in Finland.) 
(Source: the magazine Talouselämä) 
Domestic M&A (Foreign owner, located in 
Finland) 
Second, there are domestic M&As, where the acquirer is foreign-owned, 
but located in Finland. (Hence, cross-border M&As are defined as cases 
where transaction truly occurs across national borders.) (Source: the 
magazine Talouselämä)  
 
Internal restructuring Internal restructurings involve cases of transformation of a firm’s 
organizational form without the involvement of another company. For 
instance, management buy-outs that have been popular through the 
1990s and a smaller number of cases where an individual Finnish 
investor is buying the firm belong to this category of M&As. (Source: 
the magazine Talouselämä) 
  
Establishment-level features:   
  
Employment A logarithm of the average number of employed persons in the 
establishment during the year. (Source: Business Register by SF) 
  
The size of establishment  A logarithm of the number of employed persons. (Source: Business 
Register by SF) 
Firm’s age The age of a firm is measured in years. (Source: Business Register by 
SF)  
Exporter Firm is involved in export activity = 1, otherwise 0.  (Source: Business 
Register by SF) 
Share of highly educated (technical) The share of highly educated employees with technical qualifications of 
the total number of employees in an establishment. (Source: 
Employment Statistics by SF) 
Share of highly educated (other degrees) The share of highly educated employees (excluding the number of highly 
educated employees with technical qualifications) of the total number of 
employees in an establishment. (Source: Employment Statistics by SF) 
Share of employees with intermediate 
degrees 
The share of employees with middle education in an establishment. 
Reference group for the education structure is made of those with 
comprehensive education only. (Source: Employment Statistics by SF) 
  
Indicators:  
  
Firm’s legal form Legal form of firm consists of following categories: corporation, general 
partnership, co-operative society and trader. (Source: Business Register 
by SF)   
Years 15-1 (The temporal variation of different types of M&As is shown in 
Fig. 1.)  
Regions 85 regional dummies based on NUTS 4 regions stipulated by the 
European Union 
Industries 21 industry dummies (Source: Business Register by SF). (The sectoral 
variation of different types of M&As is documented in Fig. 2.)  
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The total number of establishments which were targets of mergers and acquisitions was 
7289 over the period 1989-2003. Most of the establishments purchased were part of a 
domestic M&A, with 4735 such cases. In total of these, 285 were such cases in which a 
purchaser is a domestic (i.e. located in Finland) but foreign-owned firm. The total 
number of cross-border M&As was 765 during the same period. Hence, cross-border 
M&As cover around 10% of all M&As recorded in the magazine Talouselämä. This is a 
rather small share. The number of establishments that were targets in internal 
restructurings was 1789 over the period 1989–2003.  
There is apparent variation in the volume of M&As both across time and across sectors. 
(To compress the presentation in Figs. 1-2 all domestic M&As are added together, i.e. 
domestic M&As include M&As both with a domestically-owned and a foreign-owned 
purchaser.) Fig. 1 documents the temporal variation in the number of M&As. The large 
spike in the number of domestic M&As in the year 1993 stems from the restructuring of 
the banking sector during the great depression of the early 1990s. Domestic M&As were 
most widely spread in the Finnish Savings Banks Group. Interestingly, there has been a 
substantial increase in the number of cross-border M&As during the latter part of the 
1990s. The sectoral distribution of different types of M&As is shown in Fig. 2. Cross-
border M&A activity has been most intensive in transport, the wholesale trade, and real 
estate, renting and business activities. These particular sectors cover around 60% of all 
cross-border M&As during the period of 1989-2003. The difference in the incidence of 
cross-border M&As between manufacturing and services is interesting, because most of 
the earlier papers have used data covering solely manufacturing. Domestic M&As have 
been most common, by a wide margin, in finance and insurance, reflecting the structural 
change in this particular sector during the depression.   
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Fig. 1. The number of different types of M&As over the period 1989-2003. (Two 
types of domestic M&As are added together.)  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The sectoral division of different types of M&As. (The figures are reported 
as sums over the period 1989-2003 and two types of domestic M&As are added 
together.) 
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Matched data is assembled to obtain establishment-level variables that have a potential 
influence on the likelihood of being a target of M&A and the evolution of employment 
after an incidence of M&A. (The variables not self-explanatory are described in detail in 
Table 1.) Matching is made possible by the fact that the magazine Talouselämä lists the 
names of the companies that have been involved in M&As. Hence, it is possible to 
manually link the firm codes to the names of the companies listed by the magazine. We 
have extensively used the trade register maintained by the National Board of Patents 
and Registration of Finland in this process. In addition, we have used the Business 
Register by Statistics Finland (SF). In particular, in complicated multi-plant mergers 
and acquisitions the additional information from the Business Register has been 
necessary to identify the parties of M&A on the establishment level. The information 
about M&As is linked to the Business Register by the use of the firm codes. Firms can 
further be linked to their establishments by the use of registers maintained by SF. Our 
variable of interest, employment, is obtained from the Business Register. Employment 
is measured as the average number of employees in the establishment over the year. 
This means that within-year changes do not cause problems in our analysis. In addition, 
the matched data is linked to Employment Statistics, also maintained by SF, which 
compiles information on the economic activity of individuals and their background 
characteristics (such as education). Employment Statistics contains an item of 
information (i.e. the plant code) on the employee’s employer in the last week of each 
year. As a result, it is possible to link Employment Statistics to other data sources 
maintained by SF. In particular, the variables that capture the educational structure of 
the establishments involved originate from Employment Statistics.  
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
Distinct features of M&As have notable implications for our modelling strategy. First 
and foremost, the selection of firms for targets is obviously an important issue in the 
context of M&As. Foreign companies tend to take over certain Finnish companies with 
particular observable characteristics. Hence, the fundamental problem is that it is not 
possible to analyse the effect of M&As on employment by the use of a random 
experiment in which there would be a lottery for being a target of M&A. As a result, it 
is important to take into account the endogeneity of an M&A decision when analysing 
 16 
 
the causal effect of M&As on employment. From the theoretical perspective, it is 
possible to construct a hypothesis that older and larger domestic companies are more 
likely to be acquired by a company that is not located in the same country as the target 
company, because they are often listed in stock exchanges and there is more public 
information available about them, which makes a cross-border M&A easier and less 
risky. The earlier empirical results on Finnish data (Lehto, 2006) show that foreign 
companies tend to take over firms whose workers’ education level is high, whose size is 
large and who have some contact, for example exports, to foreign countries. Second, in 
addition to selection, it is equally important to recognise that the adjustment of 
employment is not immediate, at least in the manufacturing sector. For instance, 
Siljander (2005) provides some Finnish evidence on the substantial adjustment costs of 
employment by using firm-level data from 500 largest Finnish companies that mostly 
belong to manufacturing. For that reason, we look at the effects of M&As on 
employment in time t + 1 and t + 2. The baseline for the employment level and for 
change in it is taken from t-1. The reason for this is that by analysing the effect of 
M&As on the employment level in time t-1, we can check the validity of matching, 
because M&As that occur in time t should have no effect whatsoever on the 
employment level in t-1. Because our employment variable is the average number of 
employees in the establishment during the year, the very first effects on employment 
can, in principle, seen in the year t.   
We estimate propensity score matching models when studying the effect of M&As on 
employment.6 Propensity score matching aims to mimic a random experiment by 
constructing a control group from the group of untreated companies and to ensure that 
the control group is as similar as possible to the treatment group with respect to 
observable characteristics. In our case the treatment is a situation in which a firm has 
been a target of a particular type of M&A. Matching has some distinct advantages over 
regression-based methods. First, matching does not impose any specific linearity 
assumptions on the evaluated effects that are present in regression-based modelling that 
is more commonly used in this field of research (e.g. Conyon et al. 2002b; Gugler and 
Yurtoglu, 2004). Second, matching explicitly addresses the so-called common support 
problem that finds for each untreated unit a similar treated unit. This is needed to 
                                                          
6 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) provide a survey of these methods. 
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construct the counterfactual mean that figures out what would happen to the treatment 
group without the treatment.  
To construct a control group for firms that have been targets of M&As over the period 
1989-2003, we have included all domestic firms from the Business Register by SF that 
have a turnover of at least FIM 3 million (or around 510 000 Euros). This is the very 
same limit that is used by the magazine Talouselämä when it reports M&As. Because 
we analyse the effects of M&As on employment in t+1 and t+2, we require that controls 
also have to exist in the Business Register by Statistics Finland in t+1 and t+2. The 
controls are always chosen from the set of firms who have not been a target in any kind 
of M&A during time period t-1, …, t+2. Our data allows us to make this exclusion as a 
result of which the results obtained describe, in a reliable way, the pure effect of the 
particular type of M&A. For instance, we exclude those firms that have been subjects of 
domestic M&As when analysing the effects of cross-border M&As on employment.  
Matching that is used to analyse the effect of different types of M&As on employment 
can be conducted as follows. First, Probit models for being a subject of each type of 
M&A were separately estimated in order to construct the control group. The 
establishment-level explanatory variables for the probability of observing each type of 
M&A are shown in Table 1. (The results are not reported in order to save some space, 
but they are available upon request.) These prospensity scores give predictions for the 
likelihood of becoming a target of a particular type of M&A. Propensity scores are used 
with the nearest-neighbour matching method when calculating the average treatment 
effect. We use the solely linear part of the prediction following Diamond and Sekhon 
(2005), because the compression of the probability mass around the value of zero and 
one could cause problems for matching.  
Second, the employment level (or change in it) of those that have been a target of M&A 
(i.e. the treatment group) was compared with the levels of those firms that have a 
similar prospensity (based on the predictions of Probit models) to be in the pool of firms 
taken over by other firm, but are not currently in the pool of those firms (i.e. the control 
group). After some experiments, we end up using in our analysis the program developed 
by Adadie et al. (2004) that was written for STATA in order to perform matching by the 
nearest-neighbour matching method and to calculate the corresponding average 
treatment effect on the treated. In the nearest-neighbour matching method one treated 
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unit can be matched to more than one untreated unit. After looking at the robustness of 
the results, the number of controls was set to be five for each treated unit. 
Hence, the effect of a particular type of M&A on employment can be evaluated based 
on the average treatment effect. Let Yi(W) be the outcome variable Y of establishment i. 
In our case the outcome variable is employment. W indicates whether establishment i 
has been a subject of M&As. (W is one when establishment i has been a subject of a 
particular type of M&A; otherwise it is zero.) Mi(Yj(0)) indicates the average value of 
the outcome variable Y among the controls j that are chosen for the establishment i 
based on the predictions of Probit models. The average treatment effect for the treated 
that gives a quantitative magnitude for being a subject of a particular type of M&A in 
terms of employment is calculated by using the equation 
(1)  ∑
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where NI is the number of firms that have been targets of a particular type of M&As. 
Time-invariant and industry-invariant unobservable factors, which have an asymmetric 
impact on the propensity score and on the outcome variable can cause some bias to the 
average treatment effect. For this reason and because there is a lot of variation in the 
volume of M&As across years and industries (as documented in Figs. 1-2), we used the 
formula  
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where t is year and s refers to industry level, in exact matching. Exact matching then 
ensures that the controls for the targets of different types of M&As are selected from the 
same year and from the same industry. It scales down the amount of bias associated 
with time-invariant and industry-invariant unobservable factors.  
In addition to the evaluation of different types of M&As on the employment level, we 
estimate the average treatment effects for employment changes following Blundell et al. 
(2002) by using the formula  
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where t0 is time point before M&A and t1 is time point after M&A. The underlying idea 
for this procedure is that difference-in-differences matching removes the fixed firm 
effects. The validity of the difference-in-differences estimator rests on common time 
effects across groups and no systematic composition changes within the treatment and 
the control group. 
As noted in the earlier section, our analysis is done at the establishment level. However, 
some of our variables are measured at the firm level (firm’s age and whether it is an 
exporter or not), because information on them is not available at the establishment level 
from the registers of SF. In the calculation of standard errors for these particular 
variables that are measured at the firm level we have taken into account, in the 
computation of standard errors, that observations are clustered by firms, because 
otherwise standard errors in them would be biased downwards.7  
 
6. THE RESULTS  
We present all our estimation results separately for manufacturing, construction and 
other services, and trade (including hotels and restaurants), because most of the earlier 
empirical evidence in this strand of the literature that was discussed in Section 2 of this 
paper is limited to manufacturing. (Primary production and electricity, gas and water 
supply from Fig. 2 are classified under manufacturing. “Trade (including hotels and 
restaurants)” includes sale and maintenance of motor vehicles, retail trade, wholesale 
trade, and hotels and restaurants from Fig. 2.) Non-manufacturing is further split into 
two separate sectors in order to obtain more detailed picture about the adjustment of 
employment in non-manufacturing.  
We start by summarizing very briefly the most interesting estimation results that stem 
from the Probit models in which the likelihood of each type of M&As is explained by 
establishment-level variables. (The results are not reported in order to save space, but 
they are available upon request.) The earlier results regarding these effects are reported 
                                                          
7 Moulton (1990) has analysed this problem. 
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and discussed in detail in Lehto and Lehtoranta (2004) and Lehto (2006). The models 
include indicators for a firm’s legal form, industries, regions and years. The explanatory 
variables are reported in Table 1 and their values are taken from t-1. Depending on the 
particular type of M&A and sector that we are analysing, the explanatory variables 
explain from 10 to 40 per cent of the total variation (measured by pseudo R2) in the 
dependent variable. The results reveal that cross-border M&As are more likely to occur 
for large establishments. This applies to all sectors. There is evidence that exporters are 
more likely to be involved in cross-border M&As. This effect is weakest in construction 
and other services. In general, a high share of highly educated employees seems to 
stimulate the likelihood of cross-border M&As. Hence, foreign acquirers often target 
Finnish firms with a lot of accumulated knowledge embodied in human capital. 
Interestingly, a share of highly educated employees with technical qualifications does 
not have an effect on the likelihood of cross-border M&As in construction and other 
services.  
The results for domestic M&As (both types) reveal that a firm’s age is positively related 
to the likelihood of a domestic takeover. The reason for this is most likely that the age 
of a target firm is closely related to the available information for potential acquirers. 
Older firms are often listed and there is more public information available about them. 
The education structure plays a much smaller role in the determination of domestic 
M&As (both types) compared with cross-border M&As. As expected, an increase in a 
firm’s age and an increase in the number of establishments tend to stimulate the 
likelihood of its internal restructuring. In addition, exporters are more likely to conduct 
internal restructurings. The most likely reason for this is that exporters may face more 
competition that makes them more inclined to conduct internal restructurings, which are 
often done in order to cut costs.      
The results that emerge from the matching models on the effect of different types of 
M&As on employment are summarized in Tables 2-5. They are reported as average 
treatment effects, in levels and in changes (based on the difference-in-differences 
estimator), respectively. The number of different types of M&As is somewhat smaller 
with the use of matching models than in Figs. 1-2, because explaining the employment 
level in t+2 means that we lose, by definition, three years of data (1989, 2002 and 2003) 
and a surge of cross-border M&As occurred towards the end of our observation period. 
In addition, the number of M&As is reduced with the use of matching models owing to 
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non-availability of the control variables for some establishments from the registers of 
SF. As expected, M&As that occur in time t have generally no statistically significant 
effect on employment level in t-1. This pattern emerges in all types of M&As in all 
sectors (except from the model reported in column 2 in Table 3 and from the one in 
column 1 in Table 4). This supports the validity of matching. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that even when M&As that occur in time t have a statistically 
significant effect on the employment level in t-1, the difference-in-differences estimator 
should give reliable results on the effects of different types of M&As on the 
employment change in these cases.   
The negative effects of cross-border M&As for employment are evidently strongly 
present for manufacturing. For instance, for two years since being involved in a cross-
border M&A, the average annual level of employment has declined around 14% in an 
establishment in manufacturing (Table 2; Column 1). This is in line with the findings of 
earlier empirical studies (discussed in section 2 of this paper) that have mostly used data 
covering solely manufacturing. Interestingly, for other sectors (non-manufacturing) 
there is not much evidence of negative employment effects, but for construction and 
other services the results point out to a negative employment change two years since 
being involved in a cross-border M&A. (For trade (including hotels and restaurants), 
there is even some indication of employment gains at the 10% significance level after 
one year from a cross-border M&A.) 
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Table 2. The effect of cross-border M&As on the number of employees in the 
establishment. 
  
Response: Manufacturing Construction and 
other services 
Trade (hotels and 
restaurants) 
Employment, t-1    
SATT -0.076 0.029 -0.066 
z-value  -0.58 0.32 -0.66 
Employment, t    
SATT -0.188 0.024 -0.088 
z-value  -1.41 0.23 -0.85 
Employment, t+1    
SATT -0.260* -0.015 0.007 
z-value  -1.92 -0.14 0.07 
Employment, t+2    
SATT -0.144** -0.130 -0.067 
z-value  -2.15 -1.16 -0.65 
Employment, t – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.112** -0.006 -0.022 
z-value  -2.55 -0.12 -0.70 
Employment, (t+1) – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.185** -0.045 0.073* 
z-value  -3.09 -0.69 1.76 
Employment, (t+2) – (t-1)    
SATT -0.233** -0.159** -0.001 
z-value -3.33 -2.06 -0.02 
    
The number of cross-border 
M&As 
59 97 122 
The number of potential controls  67 656 118 772 111 497 
 
Notes: Robust z statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. The number of controls 
is five in each case. SATT refers to average treatment effect 
 
The results for the employment effects of domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned 
acquirer) are substantially different from the ones that emerged for cross-border M&As 
(Table 3). In particular, the results for domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned 
acquirer) show that there are substantial negative (and statistically significant) 
employment effects for all sectors. This pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that in 
the service industries a domestic purchaser, being located in the same relevant market as 
the target firm, may have a greater interest than a foreign one to buy another firm in 
order to limit competition. Because the service market is often geographically restricted 
and because the joint use of assets (including human capital) may encounter 
geographical limits, we expected that in the service sectors the rationalisation through 
asset-sharing and the related downsizing of employment would be more typical of 
domestic M&As (and internal restructuring) than of cross-border M&As. Accordingly, 
cross-border M&As have a larger negative effect on employment than domestic M&As 
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(with a domestically-owned purchaser) in the manufacturing sector. Overall, the 
quantitative magnitude of employment losses from domestic M&As (with a 
domestically-owned purchaser) is quite similar to those reported by Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004), according to which European mergers and acquisitions reduce the 
demand for labour by about 10% on average. For instance, one year since being 
involved in a domestic M&A (with a domestically-owned acquirer), the average annual 
level of employment has declined around 9% in an establishment in trade (including 
hotels and restaurants). In general, the negative employment effects of domestic M&As 
(with a domestically-owned acquirer) are strongest for construction and other services. 
In particular, there is empirical evidence for around 20% decline in the employment 
level after two years of being a target of a domestic M&A (with a domestically-owned 
purchaser).  
 
Table 3. The effect of domestic M&As (with domestically-owned purchasers) on 
the number of employees in the establishment. 
 
Response: Manufacturing Construction and 
other services 
Trade (hotels and 
restaurants) 
Employment, t-1    
SATT -0.009 -0.107** -0.033 
z-value  -0.14 -2.21 -0.75 
Employment, t    
SATT -0.042 -0.143** -0.080* 
z-value  -0.64 -2.85 -1.80 
Employment, t+1    
SATT -0.091 -0.192** -0.094** 
z-value  -1.35 -3.64 -2.09 
Employment, t+2    
SATT -0.117* -0.203** -0.083* 
z-value  -1.69 -3.74 -1.82 
Employment, t – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.034* -0.036** -0.046** 
z-value  -1.89 -2.06 -3.41 
Employment, (t+1) – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.082** -0.085** -0.060** 
z-value  -3.03 -3.20 3.18 
Employment, (t+2) – (t-1)    
SATT -0.108** -0.097** -0.049** 
z-value -3.25 -3.07 -2.23 
    
The number of domestic M&As 340 540 770 
The number of potential controls  90 805 186 719 227 492 
 
Notes: Robust z statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. The number of controls 
is five in each case. SATT refers to average treatment effect. 
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The results for the employment effects of domestic M&As (with a foreign-owned 
acquirer) are reported in Table 4. At first sight, there are substantial employment gains 
(in levels) in the plant in the manufacturing sector after domestic M&As (with a 
foreign-owned acquirer). However, M&As that occur in time t have a statistically 
significant effect on the employment level in t-1 in this particular case, which casts 
serious doubts on the validity of matching. Indeed, the difference-in-differences 
estimator, which is reliable in this case, does not give support to the notion of 
employment gains (in changes). In addition, these particular results are based on a very 
small number of M&As. In contrast, there are large negative employment effects in 
construction and other services, but in trade (hotels and restaurants) the effects are not 
statistically significant. Internal restructurings hurt employment, too (Table 5). Their 
effect is strongest in trade (including hotels and restaurants). To sum up, our estimation 
results covering non-manufacturing reveal that it is not solely cross-border M&As that 
have statistically and economically significant, negative effects on employment. In 
general, almost all changes in ownership are associated with employment losses.   
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Table 4. The effect of domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) on the 
number of employees in the establishment. 
 
Response: Manufacturing Construction and 
other services 
Trade (hotels and 
restaurants) 
Employment, t-1    
SATT 0.461**  -0.059 0.058 
z-value  1.99 -0.35 0.26 
Employment, t    
SATT 0.411* -0.113 0.015 
z-value  1.74 -0.70 0.07 
Employment, t+1    
SATT 0.499** -0.393** -0.046 
z-value  2.04 -2.10 -0.18 
Employment, t+2    
SATT 0.359 -0.378** -0.103 
z-value  1.54 -1.91 -0.40 
Employment, t – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.050 0.053 -0.043 
z-value  -0.93 -0.87 -0.48 
Employment, (t+1) – (t-1)    
SATT  0.039 -0.333** -0.104 
z-value  0.35 2.62 -0.83 
Employment, (t+2) – (t-1)    
SATT -0.102 -0.319** -0.161 
z-value -0.80 -2.20 -1.21 
    
The number of domestic M&As 35 51 23 
The number of potential controls  29 440 125 075 44 912 
 
Notes: Robust z statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. The number of controls 
is five in each case. SATT refers to average treatment effect. 
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Table 5. The effect of internal restructurings on the number of employees in the 
establishment. 
 
Response: Manufacturing Construction and 
other services 
Trade (hotels and 
restaurants) 
Employment, t-1    
SATT -0.027 -0.137 -0.035 
z-value  -0.34 -1.60 -0.53 
Employment, t    
SATT -0.088 -0.033 -0.109 
z-value  -1.11 -0.35 -1.61 
Employment, t+1    
SATT -0.096 -0.040 -0.116* 
z-value  -1.16 -0.41 -1.70 
Employment, t+2    
SATT -0.101 -0.117 -0.186** 
z-value  -1.21 -1.04 -2.61 
Employment, t – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.061** 0.104** -0.073** 
z-value  -2.81 1.96 -3.46 
Employment, (t+1) – (t-1)    
SATT  -0.069** 0.097 -0.080** 
z-value  -2.26 1.62 2.64 
Employment, (t+2) – (t-1)    
SATT -0.074* 0.020 -0.150** 
z-value -1.94 0.22 -3.90 
    
The number of internal 
restructurings M&As 
226 303 219 
The number of potential controls  81 475 157 969 192 711 
 
Notes: Robust z statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. The number of controls 
is five in each case. SATT refers to average treatment effect. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the employment effects of different 
types of M&As on target firms by using matched establishment-level data from Finland 
over the period of 1989-2003. In this paper, we do not focus solely on cross-border or 
domestic M&As, but we analyse the employment effects of several different types of 
M&As. We classify M&As being either a cross-border M&A (in which the purchaser is 
a foreign company that is located abroad), a domestic M&A with a domestically-owned 
purchaser, a domestic M&A with a foreign-owned company that is located in Finland or 
an internal restructuring in which the purchaser is not another company. Hence, in this 
classification “foreign” has a dual meaning: firstly, it refers to the distance between the 
acquirer and the target firm and, secondly, it specifies the nationality of an acquirer’s 
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owners from the target firm’s viewpoint. Our data on M&As covers all sectors. Most of 
the earlier literature has focused on manufacturing, instead. 
We discover that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing 
employment. The effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-manufacturing 
are much weaker. Domestic M&As with a domestic purchaser, on the other hand, have 
negative employment effects for all sectors. The effect of domestic M&As with foreign-
owned purchasers on employment is remarkably negative in construction and other 
services. Internal restructurings that do not involve another company also tend to cause 
employment losses. Taken together, our most important empirical finding is that almost 
all changes in ownership lead to employment losses. That cross-border M&As had a 
negative impact only in manufacturing and that domestic M&As with foreign-owned 
purchasers had, however, a substantial negative impact on employment in construction 
and other services may emerge from the situation in which foreign interference in 
service industries develops in two stages: first to establish a bridgehead through a cross-
border M&A, and after this to strengthen the dominance of the market through domestic 
M&As. Apparently the deep-going rationalisation of activities is typical only of the 
latter stage, because deeper knowledge of the market has developed for a foreign player. 
 Our reading of the evidence is that the focus of the earlier empirical studies primarily 
on manufacturing (and listed companies) when analysing the employment effects of 
M&As can deliver a seriously distorted picture about the adjustment of employment that 
takes place in broader industries. In particular, the negative effects of cross-border 
M&As on employment are almost non-existent in non-manufacturing. In addition, the 
negative effects of M&As on employment do not arise exclusively from cross-border 
M&As. Hence, the evidence points out that cross-border M&As seem to be less specific 
regarding their effects on employment than has previously been thought. A prominent 
explanation for employment losses is that the change in control through M&As offers 
an opportunity for new management team to renege on implicit labour contracts that 
have constituted obstacles for layoffs (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Our results call for 
more empirical studies that incorporate information from non-manufacturing sectors 
covering several different types of M&As. 
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